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Non-technical summary 
 
Downward rigid wages are of major importance in economic policy and are severely 
discussed in the public. Especially in Germany, where the nominal wage level is above that of 
its main international competitors, economists often recommend to freeze or lower nominal 
wages, at least in adverse economic conditions. This study first analyzes how often nominal 
wages are frozen or cut. Wage cutting appears as a rather rare event. Over a five year time 
span, only about 16% of firms in manufacturing and 13% of firms in services ever cut their 
wages. Compared to wage cuts, wage freezes are much more frequent. They occur three times 
as often as wage cuts in manufacturing, and more than four times as often in services. Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that German firms have become quite flexible in the last five 
years to adjust at the wage margin when poor business conditions required it. 
 
Wage freezes are more frequent in services than in manufacturing, whereas wage cuts are less 
frequent. These significant sector differences do not vanish if one controls for individual firm 
characteristics influencing the incidence of wage freezes and wage cuts, notably coverage by 
collective agreements and the degree of price competition on the product market. 
 
Which reasons prevent the firms from cutting their wages? In case of wage cuts, three-fourths 
of the employers fear the decreasing morale and the poorer effort and/or service of their 
employees. Additionally, about 60% of firms refer to labour legislation and 40% to collective 
wage agreements. The key difference between the responses of manufacturing and services 
appears in the realm of worker turnover. One third of firms in services fear increasing quits 
and excess worker turnover. This reason could explain fewer wage cuts in services. According 
to our empirical estimates, this argument is mentioned much more frequently by services 
firms than by manufacturing firms, even after accounting for the differences in relevant firm 
characteristics. The sector specific effect probably reflects the fact that actual worker turnover 
rates in services are much higher – more than twice as high, in our data – than in 
manufacturing.  
 
The survey includes a wide range of services. Therefore, within the service sector the 
incidence of nominal rigidity broadly varies. Wage freezes are most frequent in the IT sector 
where the relevant labour market is generally very flexible, and least frequent in real estate 
activities. Results for wage cuts are the same, as the latter occur most often in the IT sector 
and quite rarely in real estate activities. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Starre Löhne sind häufig Gegenstand der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion. Aufgrund des im 
internationalen Kontext vergleichsweise hohen Lohnniveaus in Deutschland wird dort oft 
gefordert, die nominalen Löhne sollten nicht weiter steigen oder sogar sinken. In der 
vorliegenden Studie gehen wir anhand einer neuen Umfrage zum Lohn- und Preissetzungs-
verhalten deutscher Firmen zunächst der Frage auf den Grund, wie häufig Nominallöhne 
eingefroren oder gekürzt werden. 
 
In den letzten fünf Jahren wurden die nominalen Löhne im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe und im 
Dienstleistungsgewerbe in 16% bzw. 13% der befragten Unternehmen gekürzt. Wesentlich 
häufiger wurden die Löhne allerdings eingefroren, und zwar mit 46% dreimal so oft im 
Verarbeitenden Gewerbe und mit 57% viermal so oft im Dienstleistungssektor. Diese 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die deutschen Unternehmen im Beobachtungszeitraum flexibler 
geworden sind und ihre Löhne einer schlechten Geschäftslage entsprechend anpasst haben. 
Während das Nominallohnniveau also häufiger im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe als im 
Dienstleistungssektor abgesenkt wird, verhält es sich mit stagnierenden Löhnen genau 
umgekehrt. Dieser Sektorenunterschied bleibt auch dann bestehen, wenn man für relevante 
individuelle Firmencharakteristika, die auf das Lohnsetzungsverhalten einwirken kontrolliert. 
Hierzu gehören insbesondere die Tarifbindung und die Wettebewerbsintensität auf dem 
Gütermarkt über Preise. 
 
Welche Gründe halten Firmen davon ab, die Löhne ihrer Mitarbeiter zu kürzen? In den 
Antworten der Firmen zeigt sich, dass Dreiviertel der Arbeitgeber befürchten, die Stimmung 
der Belegschaft könne im Falle von Lohneinschnitten sinken und die Mitarbeiter könnten ihr 
Engagement deutlich einschränken. Auch arbeitsrechtliche Vorschriften (60%) und kollektive 
Tariflohnverträge (40%) hindern die Unternehmen daran, die Löhne ihrer Mitarbeiter zu 
kürzen. Der wesentliche Unterschied zwischen Dienstleistern und  Industrie liegt allerdings in 
der befürchteten Personalfluktuation. Ein Drittel der Dienstleister sorgt sich vor einem 
Weggang der besser qualifizierten Mitarbeiter und damit verbundener höherer Kosten der 
Einstellung und Einarbeitung neuer Mitarbeiter. Diese Sorge vor übermäßiger Personal-
fluktuation dürfte ein entscheidender Grund dafür sein, weshalb unter den Dienstleistern 
seltener Lohnkürzungen beobachtet werden als im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe 
 
Die in der Umfrage erfassten Dienstleisterbranchen sind sehr heterogen. Werden die 
einzelnen Branchen in ihrer Vielfalt genauer analysiert, so ist festzustellen, dass die 
jeweiligen nominalen Lohnrigiditäten sehr unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sind. Stagnierende 
Löhne sind beispielsweise auf dem flexiblen Arbeitsmarkt des IT-Sektors wesentlich häufiger 
anzutreffen als im Grundstücks- und Wohnungswesen. Analog fällt das Ergebnis bei den 
Lohnkürzungen aus, die am häufigsten im IT-Sektor und am seltensten im Grundstücks- und 
Wohnungswesen  auftreten. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper provides insight into the nature of wage rigidity using direct evidence from a 
new and large employer survey on wage and price setting behaviour for Germany. The 
core interest is in two dimensions. First, how frequent are wage freezes and wage cuts? 
Second, why do firms shy away from not raising wages? The paper adds to the literature 
which has concentrated on the manufacturing sector by focusing on services. In 
particular, we analyze whether there is less wage rigidity in services than in 
manufacturing where we expect wages to be less flexible due to a lower labour share 
and a higher degree of unionization. We also analyze whether the sources of wage 
rigidity are the same or different in the two sectors.  
Downward wage rigidity, or rather the incidence of nominal wage cuts or freezes, is an 
emerging field of study. There are two strands in the literature. One is micro 
econometric studies, starting with Kahn (1997), which seek to estimate frequency and 
size of nominal wage rigidities on the basis of individual wage change data. The 
evidence from this literature is hard to generalize, due to country and time effects. 
Empirical estimates for the incidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in Germany 
are in the range of 2% to 28%.
1
 It seems that results depend on the respective micro data 
base and especially on the methodological approach. For example, estimates by 
Beissinger and Knoppik (2001) suggest that nominal wage rigidity is quite common in 
Germany. In contrast, results presented by Bauer et al. (2007) imply that this type of 
nominal rigidity is rather infrequent, if one allows for a second type of downward wage 
rigidity, real or contractual rigidity, that may occur in the positive domain of the wage 
change distribution.  
The micro econometric literature provides little evidence on sector-specific wage 
rigidity. An exception is Bauer et al. (2003) who observe substantial variation of real or 
contractual rigidity across twelve private sectors in West Germany. According to their 
estimates, wages are least flexible in societal services and most flexible in construction. 
For Belgium, Fuss and Wintr (2008) show that wages, employment and hours are less 
responsive to variations in firm-level productivity in the service sector than in other 
sectors. In a cross-country study, Messina et al. (2008) estimate sector effects on 
downward wage rigidity, and confirm that workforce composition and unions’ role in 
wage negotiations are important drivers of downward nominal wage rigidity.  
                                                
1
 Bauer et al. (2007) display 28.4% in 2000 in the private sector (Table 4, p.28), Beissinger and Knoppik 
(2005) 28% for 1994-2001 (Table 5, p.29), Corneließen and Huebler (2008) an average of only 2% for 
1984-2004 (Table 2, p.218). Bläs (2008) even discovers 59-78% for blue collars and 70-86% for white 
collars (p.47).  
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A second strand of the literature is based on firm level survey data. The focus of the 
survey literature is typically on the relevant sources of wage rigidity, i.e. not cutting 
wages when the firm would prefer to do so. This line of research started with case 
studies (Kaufman (1984), Blinder and Choi (1990)). Campbell and Kamlani (1997) 
focused on five prominent explanations of wage rigidity and introduced three skill 
groups of labour. The most important explanation according to their study is based on 
adverse selection in quits and on the effect of wages on effort. The latter effect is 
stronger for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers. Bewley (1999) carried out free-
form interviews with stake holders to find that U.S. employers avoid wage cuts because 
they expect that they would demoralize workers and reduce workers’ effort. A core 
result by Zoega and Karlsson (2006) is that managers avoid wage reductions in slumps 
because they fear that the most experienced or productive workers would leave the firm, 
and that there would be excess quitting. Agell and Bennmarker (2007) explore a random 
survey of Swedish human resource managers to show that the reasons for wage rigidity 
differ between larger and smaller establishments, and that there are significant 
complementarities between efficiency wages and bargaining strength. For Germany, 
studies by Pfeiffer (2003) and Franz and Pfeiffer (2005, 2006) find evidence for labour 
union contracts and implicit contracts as important sources of wage rigidity for the 
medium and less skilled. However, these results are drawn from a rather small survey of 
firms operating in a few sectors only. 
This paper explores German data drawn from a new and comparatively large employer 
survey. This survey was initiated by the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a 
Eurosystem research network coordinated by the European Central Bank. Experts from 
17 European National Banks developed a harmonized employer survey on wage and 
price setting behaviour, which was carried out independently in each country. 
Two papers explore the international dimension of the survey. Babeck? et al. (2008) 
show that European employers rarely cut wages. They make frequent use of other, more 
flexible components of compensation to adjust labour costs. According to Druant et al. 
(2008), wages are stickier, i.e. adjust less frequently, in services firms than in 
manufacturing firms. 
This research, which has been undertaken as part of the WDN, focuses on the within 
country variation using the German part of the survey. It extends the literature by 
adding comparative information on the incidence and sources of nominal wage rigidity 
by sector. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and 
data set. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.  
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2. Sample and Survey 
The survey on wage and price setting was carried out, on behalf of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, by the ifo Institute, Munich, in November 2007. The questionnaire was 
sent out in written form to the participants of the monthly ifo business cycle survey in 
manufacturing and services. The information was normally given by CEOs, controllers 
and personnel managers. Altogether, about 4,600 German firms were asked to 
participate, thereof 3,100 from manufacturing and 1,500 from service industries. Firms 
report for product groups, which in most cases coincide with plants. Most firms are 
single plant firms. Large plants reply for several product groups separately. In firms 
with several plants, the largest product group was selected for this special survey. The 
service sector covered in our sample is quite heterogeneous. It ranges from labour-
intensive branches like hotels and restaurants to public-oriented branches like waste 
disposal. 
The overall response rate in the survey was about 39% in manufacturing and 44% in 
services. Response rates were especially high among those firms that regularly 
participate in the standard ifo business cycle survey.
2
 A disadvantage of the ifo business 
cycle survey is that sampling is not fully representative but “by purpose” due to 
historical reasons.
3
  
The survey delivers a range of basic firm characteristics like firm size, firm age, 
location (East or West Germany), export share, labour cost share and worker turnover. 
The data also contains information on worker structure including employment by level 
of education, type of contract (permanent or fixed term) and working time (part-time or 
full-time). Some information on the relevant product market, like intensity of price 
competition and the price setting mechanism, is included. 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal the expected differences between firms in 
industries and services. Services sector firms are much smaller and younger. Export 
shares are significantly higher  in manufacturing. Services are usually more labour 
intensive. The labour cost share is on average about 43% in services, compared to 32% 
in manufacturing. To some degree, the labour cost gap reflects the markedly higher 
share of less educated, blue collar workers in manufacturing. Manufacturing firms are 
                                                
2
 Quality of responses is in general very good. For the empirical analysis, we only lose 1.6% of the 
original data due to missing or inconsistent observations. 
3
 Germany had no firm register before 1995, so random sampling was impossible. Instead, researchers 
had to decide deliberately which firm to ask, for example, based on published sales figures. This is called 
sampling by purpose or purposive sampling. In recent years, the sample has been refreshed carefully to 
make it more representative. 
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broadly covered by collective agreements (43%). In contrast, only 38% of services 
firms apply collective wage contracts, reflecting a lower degree of unionization. 
Part-time work and fixed term contracts, facilitating adjustment to shocks, are more 
frequent in services. At the same time, employers perceive the labour market as tight 
more often in services (26%) than in manufacturing (17%). Worker turnover rates are 
much higher in services (31%) than in manufacturing (13%), too. Thus, we would 
hypothesize that services sector firms are more concerned with hold up problems. 
 
Table 1: Firm Characteristics 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Wage and Price Setting Survey. Means in percentages. Sample: Altogether 
1,810 observations, thereof 1,149 in manufacturing and 661 in services. Individual firms didn’t answer 
every question. 
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Incidence of Wage Freezes and Wage Cuts 
In this study, we employ the frequency of wage freezes or wage cuts at the firm level as 
a proxy for wage flexibility. The survey directly asks about the incidence of wage 
freezes and wage cuts in the past. The specific question reads: ”Over the past five years, 
has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been frozen (cut) instead of 
being increased?” By linking the occurrence of wage freezes or wage cuts to the 
standard of a wage increase, we obtain a clear reference point for our interpretation.
4
 
Note that this benchmark is different from that common in micro econometric studies 
analyzing wage change distributions. In these studies zero nominal wage changes are 
seen as an alternative to (impossible) wage cuts and ergo seen as characteristic for wage 
inflexibility. 
Due to the five year time span covered, the annual rates of wage freezes and wage cuts 
will be smaller than the reported rates. Thus we tend to overestimate the amount of 
wage flexibility. On the other hand, as the survey questions refers to the ”base wage”, 
defined as the direct remuneration excluding bonuses (regular wage and salary, 
commissions, piecework payments), we may underestimate the degree to which wage 
compensation of labour is flexible. 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. Wage cutting appears as a rather rare event. 
Over a five year time span, only about 16% of firms in manufacturing and 13% of firms 
in services ever cut their wages. Thus the two sectors seem to differ only slightly 
regarding the incidence of downward adjustment of nominal wages. 
Compared to wage cuts, wage freezes, i.e. zero wage changes, are much more frequent. 
They occur three times as often as wage cuts in manufacturing, and more than four 
times as often in services. Thus they are more common in services than in 
manufacturing.  
 
                                                
4
 This benchmark is peculiar to the German survey and missing in other surveys. It was included as a 
result of pre-test interviews showing that German firms usually experience and expect nominal wage 
increases. One would expect that by inclusion of a reference point the number of positive answers to the 
wage setting questions goes down rather than up. 
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Table 2: Incidence of Wage Freezes and Wage Cuts 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Wage and Price Setting Survey. 
 
Labour market conditions are quite diverse for the various services covered by our data. 
For example, restaurants basically face a close to free market where union power is 
weak. Wages are often bargained at the individual level. Conditions in computer 
services and related activities are similar. At the other extreme, wages in the highly 
regulated waste disposal sector are strongly driven by collective wage agreements, 
implying a less competitive labour market. 
Table 2 also displays descriptive results within the service sector. Wage cutting policy 
differs broadly: While one fifth of all firms in computer services cut their wages over 
the past five years, only 3% in the real estate activities did. The same sectoral 
differences emerge regarding wage freezes. Up to 68% of firms in computer services 
froze their wages, compared to only 34% in real estate activities. Wage freezes are also 
quite common in hotels and restaurants (63%). 
Tests on the equality of unconditional branch means with regard to wage freezes 
suggest that there is indeed substantial variation within the service sector.
5
 In 17 of the 
21 pair-wise combinations of branches, differences in means are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. 
The international dimension of the WDN Wage and Price Setting Survey allows 
comparing these figures to those of 15 other European countries: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal Spain and Slovenia. Somewhat surprisingly, both the rate 
                                                
5
 Test results are presented in Table A.1 in appendix. 
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of wage freezes and wage cuts turns out much higher in Germany. According to our 
calculations, wage freezes occur with a frequency of only 3% in the EU average, 
whereas the incidence of wage cuts is about 9%. 
The reasons for the wide gap between Germany and the other EU countries are difficult 
to explain. One interpretation would be that the collective wage bargaining system in 
Germany has indeed become rather flexible. In some branches, for example, nominal 
wages have not been raised for a longer time period, as a result of collective agreement 
or holdout. Also opening clauses to keep the wage level constant in firms with 
economic difficulties have become more popular. A second explanation would be that 
over the five-year-period in retrospect, countries were captured at different stages of 
their business cycle. At least, the time frame covers a period of rather weak economic 
growth in Germany after the turn of the century. 
Next, we control for factors that may explain the incidence of wage freezes by 
estimating binary probit models. For convenience, Table 3 reports marginal effects 
instead of parameter estimates. We employ four model specifications. Models 1-3 pool 
all observations from manufacturing and services. Model 1 includes a set of firm 
characteristics without the sector dimension, model 2 includes a single dummy to 
control for differences between services and manufacturing sectors, and model 3 
includes a full set of individual service sector dummies to capture variation within the 
sector. Finally, model 4 estimates the same specification as model 1, but on a reduced 
sample representing the service sector. 
As expected, firms that are growing in employment exhibit systematically lower 
propensities to freeze wages. Assuming that employment growth indicates a favourable 
business situation for the firm, the necessity to freeze wages becomes smaller. Our 
econometric approach does not rule out, however, that firms hire more workers because 
they managed to reduce real labour costs by freezing nominal wages. 
The estimation results also suggest that wages freezes are significantly less common in 
firms covered by a collective agreement. At the mean, the propensity of wage freezes is 
20 percentage points smaller in covered firms compared to non-covered firms. One 
interpretation is that firms cannot or do not systematically use the potential means to 
circumvent collective bargaining outcomes normally imposing wage growth, e.g. via 
opening clauses. A second explanation is that firms requiring wage freezes leave the 
collective agreement system. 
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Table 3: Probit Estimates on Incidence of Wage Freezes 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Deutsche Bundesbank Wage and Price Setting Survey. 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes 
significance at the 10% level. Firm size is the logarithmic level of employees. 
The “other” category merges firms active in post and telecommunication, renting of machinery and 
equipment, labour recruitment and provision of personnel, investigation and security activities, and call 
centre activities. 
 
Furthermore, we observe that wage freezes are more prevalent in smaller firms, firms 
with a higher labour cost share and firms facing strong price competition. Works 
councils (or trade unions) in large firms may have stronger ability to assert themselves 
and to fight wage freezes. Labour intensive firms tend to have a higher wage bill and 
thus incentives to adjust at the labour cost margin are relatively large. Firms in strong 
 9 
competition have more difficulties to adjust at the price margin and therefore may prefer 
the labour cost margin. 
None of our models reveals significant correlation between wage freezes and labour 
shortages faced by the firm (approximated by the firm’s reported difficulties to hire 
workers) and worker turnover (measured by the total of hiring and separation rates). 
We find some weak evidence that in services, a higher share of blue collar workers 
raises the propensity to freeze wages. One hypothesis to explain this result is that 
bargaining power of unskilled workers is especially weak in this sector. Although 
parameters are less precisely estimated on the reduced sample in model 4, overall the 
estimated parameters on the firm characteristics are consistent with the estimates on the 
full sample. Thus identification of the parameters generally does not only come from 
the manufacturing sector data. 
Looking at model 2, we find that after controlling for individual firm characteristics, 
there remains a marked difference between manufacturing and services concerning 
wage freezes. At the mean, the propensity to freeze wages is 9.2 percentage points 
higher in services than in manufacturing. This difference is large relative to the 
unconditional disparity between sectors (compare Table 2). Thus, the observable firm 
characteristics included in our model do not seem to contribute much to explain the 
behavioural gap between the two sectors. 
The simple sector dummy considered in model 2 may hide relevant differences within 
the service sector. Model 3 including individual service sector dummies suggests that 
the services-manufacturing advantage is mostly driven by behaviour in the hotels and 
restaurants sector, the transport sector (including supporting activities), and to weaker 
extent also by the IT sector.  
We now turn to the incidence of wage cuts. Table 4 summarizes the estimation results 
for the same four empirical models as above. Altogether, there is little systematic 
correlation between individual firm characteristics and the propensity of wage cuts. The 
factors that are significantly correlated with the incidence of wage freezes appear 
uncorrelated with the incidence of wage cuts, at least at conventional statistical levels.
6
 
Still the parameters estimated on coverage by collective agreement and employment 
growth seem to exhibit the same sign. The only impact variable that has a marked 
impact on both wage freezes and wage cuts is price competition. Stronger competition 
on the product market thus appears as an important key to enhance wage flexibility. 
                                                
6
 Since wage cuts are a rather rare event, it is difficult to establish significant correlations in our sample. 
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Table 4: Probit Estimates on Incidence of Wage Cuts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Deutsche Bundesbank Wage and Price Setting Survey. 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes 
significance at the 10% level 
 
Some specific features emerge looking at wage cuts. First, wage cuts have been 
significantly less common in East Germany in the observation period. Comparing the 
results of models 1-3 to that of model 4, this regional disparity is attributable to the 
behaviour in manufacturing. A tentative explanation is that the wage level in East 
German manufacturing is still below the West German level, and that wages and 
productivity are still catching up, making the necessity to cut wages less likely. Second, 
 11
taking into account that reverse causality might yield parameter estimates with a 
downward bias, there is some weak evidence that worker turnover rates are negatively 
correlated with the propensity to cut wages, especially in manufacturing. Firms that 
experience high worker turnover rates could avoid wage cuts to prevent further quits. 
Model 2 shows that at the mean, wage cuts are 6.4 percentage points less frequent in 
services than in manufacturing. It appears that controlling for firm characteristics 
renders the services-manufacturing-gap larger – compare the unconditional means in 
Table 2. Model 3 shows that the gap mostly emerges from fewer wage cuts in the real 
estate, hotel and restaurants, and transport (except supporting activities) sectors. If we 
compare the estimates of model 3 for wage cuts, we see that these are the sectors with a 
stronger propensity of wage freezes. 
Looking at the estimated sector differentials for wage cuts and wage freezes combined, 
one could set up the hypothesis that the higher rate of wage freezes in services is a 
product of the lower rate of wage cuts. This is indeed the fundamental assumption 
underlying much of the wage rigidity literature investigating distributions of individual 
wage changes, quoted in the introduction. The supposition is that firms that could not 
cut wages resort to the smallest possible wage change instead, i.e. do freeze wages 
instead of cutting them. However, in our data, we do not find a significant negative 
correlation between the incidence of past wage cuts and freezes at the firm level. 
In any case, our estimates suggest that there is an especial aversion against wage cuts in 
services compared to manufacturing. Next, we turn to firms’ perception of reducing 
nominal wages, in order to check whether there are sector-specific reasons preventing 
wage cuts. 
3.2 Reasons for Preventing Wage Cuts 
In order to learn about firms’ attitudes towards wage cuts, we introduced this subject 
into our questionnaire asking directly:  
”Even in times of bad economic conditions or high unemployment firms tend to 
cut their employees’ wages rarely - although this could help firms to survive on 
the market and help to save jobs. Which reasons prevent you from cutting base 
wages? Please tick the three most important reasons.“ 
It follows a list of seven reasons for downward wage rigidity. The potential reasons are 
rooted in the literature. They include the possibility of: 
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• Efficiency Wage Considerations: Firms may not want to cut wages because 
they fear that employees’ morale decreases, in line with the theoretical 
arguments by Akerlof (1982), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Bewley (1999).
7
 
• Labour Regulation: Firms may not have the possibility to cut wages because 
they are, or at least they think that they are, constrained by labour market 
legislation. 
• Collective Agreements: Firms may not be allowed to cut wages because they 
signed a collective agreement prescribing the wage adjusting and excluding an 
opening clause to deviate if the firm is in a poor state of business. 
• Loss of Reputation: Firms may be afraid that cutting wages would damage their 
reputation as an employer, making it more difficult to hire good workers in the 
future, an argument put forward by Weiss (1980). 
• Excessive Worker Turnover: According to Schlicht (1978) and Salop (1979), 
wage cuts could impose costs on the firm, if it yields an increase in the number 
of employees who quit, increasing the cost of hiring and training new workers in 
the future. 
• Implicit Wage Smoothing: Assuming that workers dislike unpredictable 
reductions in income, workers and firms could reach an implicit understanding 
that wages will not fall in recessions and instead increase less in expansions 
(Azariades (1975), Rosen (1985)). 
• Improved Outside Options for Workers: Workers may compare their wages 
to those of similarly qualified workers in other firms in the same market, and 
move to these firms (Lindbeck and Snower (1988), Agell and Bennmarker 
(2007)). 
The question was posed to all firms. The responses therefore cover firms that have cut 
wages in the past as well as the vast majority of firms that did not. Table 5 displays the 
frequencies of the mentioned reasons in percent. They do not add up to unity, as firms 
were allowed to mention more than one reason. 
                                                
7
 We implemented only one version of efficiency wages in our survey, as according to Franz and Pfeiffer 
(2006), the incremental contribution of additional versions of efficiency wages for the explanation of 
wage rigidity seems to be rather small. 
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Table 5: Share of Firms Mentioning a Reason as Relevant for Preventing Wage 
Cuts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Deutsche Bundesbank Wage and Price Setting Survey. 
Note: 1,054 observations in manufacturing, 594 in services. 
 
Altogether the responses by sector are similar. In both manufacturing and services, loss 
of reputation, implicit wage smoothing and improved outside options arguments are 
only relevant for a minority of firms. Around three quarter of firms mention the 
efficiency wage argument against wage freezes as important. This survey thus confirms 
the high importance of the efficiency wage explanation for preventing wage cuts, as 
already found by Bewley (1999) for the U.S. and Franz and Pfeiffer (2006) for 
Germany. According to our data, the argument appears more relevant in firms not 
following a collective agreement. If one conditions on our standard set of firm 
characteristics, firms without an agreement, at the margin, mention the efficiency rate 
argument about 11 percentage points more often.
8
 This correlation is probably due to a 
selection process. Firms that seek flexible wages as a means of incentive pay in general 
will probably rather avoid collectively agreed pay schemes.  
Reverse causality may also drive a significant negative correlation between the 
difficulty of firms to hire workers and their attitudes toward the efficiency wage 
argument. Firms that care little about employee morale might be less attractive to 
workers and thus face shortages in labour supply. The difference between 
manufacturing and services in the propensity to mention the efficiency wage argument 
remains statistically insignificant after controlling for the sector-specific firm 
characteristics, confirming the impression from the raw data. 
A clear majority of firms also mentions labour regulation as a reason preventing wage 
cuts. The result is somewhat surprising. Strictly speaking, there is no general regulation 
in German labour law inhibiting wage cuts. One interpretation is that firms generally 
                                                
8
 The results of this and the next regression are on display in the Appendix in Table A.2. 
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perceive collective agreements as universally binding.
9
 This would be an information 
error, as this is true only in very few sectors, e.g. construction. An alternative 
interpretation would be that employers mean that individual work contracts do not 
accommodate the possibility of wage cuts. And even if they do, employers can not cut 
individual wages without approval from a works council, which exist in most of the 
larger firms and are typically dominated by trade unions. 
A direct influence of trade unions on wage flexibility is via collective agreements. 45% 
of firms in manufacturing and 33% of firms in services mention collective agreements 
as a core reason for preventing wage cuts. The sector difference basically reflects the 
difference in collective agreement coverage between services and manufacturing, see 
Table 2. From a probit regression that contains our standard firm characteristics, we 
obtain that at the margin, the fact that a firm is being covered by a collective agreement 
implies a 60 percentage point higher propensity to mention the collective bargaining 
argument against wage cuts. We therefore confirm the result stressed by Pfeiffer (2003) 
that in Germany collective bargaining agreements seriously hinder firms from cutting 
wages. In fact, after controlling for differential collective bargaining coverage between 
sectors, the gap between manufacturing and services regarding the incidence of the 
collective bargaining argument becomes statistically insignificant (s. Table A.2). 
A key difference between manufacturing and services, however, emerges with regards 
to the perception of the worker turnover argument. The fear of increasing quits and 
excess worker turnover is much higher among service sector firms. This fits with the 
high labour intensity of the service sector, relatively higher general worker turnover, 
and the perception of a tighter labour market among service sector firms. Considering 
the higher share of white collar workers in services, the result is also consistent with a 
finding by Franz and Pfeiffer (2006), namely that negative signals for new hires are a 
more important cause of wage rigidity for better skilled workers. 
A closer look reveals some variation regarding the worker turnover argument within the 
services sector. It is the least relevant in the waste disposal sector, characterised by little 
product market competition and a high share of firms in public ownership, where only 
one in five firms mentions the argument. At the other extreme, one in two firms 
operating in the IT sector fear increased worker turnover in response to wage cuts. The 
IT sector in fact turns out to be rather special among services also in other dimensions. 
As unionization is very low, only very few firms (5%) mention the collective bargaining 
argument, and also the rate of firms mentioning the labour regulation argument (50%) is 
                                                
9
 As firms give more than one reason, we can compute a correlation matrix. In the tendency, firms 
mention the labour regulation argument and the collective bargaining argument together. 
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lower than in any other services branch covered. On the other hand, the rate of firms 
mentioning the loss of reputation (29%), outside options for workers (12%) and implicit 
wage smoothing (20%) arguments is larger than anywhere else in the service sector. 
These observations are consistent with the IT sector being a very dynamic branch with 
high worker turnover, shortage of qualified workers and no tradition of collective 
bargaining or works council institutions. 
 
Table 6: Probit Estimates on Worker Turnover Reason for Preventing Wage Cuts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Deutsche Bundesbank Wage and Price Setting Survey. 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
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In Table 6 we focus on the factors potentially driving the worker turnover argument 
using our four regular empirical models. A number of individual firm characteristics 
systematically impact on firms’ awareness of the worker turnover argument. The 
empirical findings are generally consistent with our expectations. First, the higher the 
share of white collar workers, the more relevant is the worker turnover argument. Better 
qualified workers tend to have more outside options, and the costs of replacing more 
productive workers associated with hiring and training tend to be higher. Second, firms 
that grow in employment are markedly more aware of excess worker turnover due to 
wage cuts. They have an interest in keeping quit rates low to facilitate their growth 
process. Third, the worker turnover argument is significantly less relevant in East 
Germany where there are fewer outside options for workers in view of the still high 
level of unemployment compared to West Germany. 
Two other significant impact variables might proxy worker turnover. Larger firms tend 
to be more aware of the holdup problem associated with wage cuts. The highly 
significant negative impact of collective agreements in the firm on the incidence of the 
worker turnover argument may work via two channels. On the one hand, quitting from a 
unionized firm is less attractive. There is a risk to move to a non-unionized firm with 
less employment security or lower wages. For example, Lucifora (1998) shows that 
trade unions reduce the individual firm’s labour turnover. On the other hand, unionized 
firms are a non-random sample of firms. High turnover firms have a certain incentive to 
leave the collective bargaining system to facilitate adjustment of labour. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the rate of worker turnover in the individual firm does not have 
an independent impact on the relevance of the worker turnover argument. However, as 
explained above, the significant impact factors probably already cover much of the 
variation in quit rates across firms. 
The different observed firm specific characteristics do not explain the different 
prevalence of the excess worker turnover argument in services and manufacturing. The 
positive and significant sector gap estimated with model 2 (14.7 percentage points) is 
even slightly larger than the gap in the raw data (12.7 percentage points). As we control 
for individual firm level worker turnover, the estimated disparity might capture the 
general difference in worker turnover between sectors (18.4 percentage points, cf. Table 
1). This interpretation is supported by the fact that the parameter on the worker turnover 
variable estimated on the full sample becomes smaller by inclusion of the services 
sector dummy, compare model 1 to models 2-3. Model 3 shows that the difference 
between services and manufacturing is mostly driven by the computer and land 
transport (including supporting activities) services, but also other business activities 
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covering especially labour intensive branches like labour recruitment and provision of 
personnel, investigation and security activities, and call centre activities. 
4. Conclusions 
According to the information obtained from a new and relatively large-scale survey 
covering firms in manufacturing and services, wage freezes appear rather frequently in 
Germany, especially in comparison to other European countries. Over the past five 
years, wage freezes instead of wage increases have occurred in about one in two firms. 
In comparison, wage cuts instead of wage increases are a rather rare event. They have 
occurred in only about one in seven firms. Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
German firms have become quite flexible during the last five years to adjust at the wage 
margin when poor business conditions required it. 
Beyond these basic facts, we observe clearly distinct sector behaviour. Wage freezes are 
more frequent in services than in manufacturing, whereas wage cuts are less frequent. 
The significant sector differences do not vanish if one controls for individual firm 
characteristics influencing the incidence of wage freezes and wage cuts, notably 
coverage by collective agreements and the degree of price competition on the product 
market. 
A reason preventing wage cuts that is especially important in this sector could explain 
fewer wage cuts in services, namely fear of excess worker turnover. According to our 
empirical estimates, this argument is mentioned much more frequently by services firms 
than by manufacturing firms, even after accounting for the differences in relevant firm 
characteristics. The sector specific effect probably reflects the fact that actual worker 
turnover rates in services are much higher – more than twice as high, in our data – than 
in manufacturing. With regard to the core reasons preventing wage cuts, i.e. efficiency 
wage arguments and institutional constraints, in contrast, we do not find any differences 
in firms’ attitudes between sectors.  
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Appendix 
 
 
A.1 Tests on the Equality of Sample Means 
Note: The table presents t-statistics. Bold font is used where there is significant difference within 
services. 
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A.2 Probit Estimates on Collective Agreement and on Efficiency and Morale as 
Reasons for Preventing Wage Cuts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
